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1917: The
Darkness
Falls
DANIEL J. MAHONEY

T

March 1917: The Red Wheel, Node III, Book 1,
by Alexander Solzhenitsyn,
translated by Marian Schwartz
(Notre Dame, 672 pp., $39)

Bolshevik coup d’état of
October 25 (November 7
according to the Western
calendar), 1917, is known
the whole world over as the Russian
Revolution. It is nearly universally
considered to be either a liberating
event or a catastrophic one, but one that
in either case profoundly shaped universal history. Alexander Solzhenitsyn
was an indefatigable enemy of Communism and all its works, but he considered the major event of 1917 to be
the February revolution (to use the old
Julian calendar) and not the October
coup that flowed inexorably from the
overthrow of the czarist order earlier
that year. The February revolution, in
Solzhenitsyn’s considered judgment,
was a disaster of the first order and not
a welcome, democratic eruption in a
HE
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country ill-prepared for democracy. A
reader of March 1917 (Node III of The
Red Wheel, the nodes being a series of
“narratives in discrete periods of
time”) would be hard put to quarrel
with Solzhenitsyn’s judgment. As this
great work of history and literature
attests, February indeed was the root of
all the evils to come and not a brief
shining display of Russian democracy.
The previous nodes, August 1914
and November 1916, centered respectively on the disastrous Battle of
Tannenberg and on a deceptive period
of quiescence before the outbreak of
revolution in 1917, the proverbial
calm before the storm. This volume
consists of 170 chapters (out of 656 in
March 1917 as a whole), most of them
relatively brief. One experiences on
every page the frenzied pace of events
spiraling completely out of control.
From the first pages, we confront an
emperor incapable of serious thought
or action. Even the little czarevitch
Alexei asks why his father is “so weak.”
Nicholas is a decent man and a good
Christian, but a terribly incompetent
ruler. “The family was Nikolai’s favorite milieu.” He preferred to be with
Alexandra and the family in “untroubled seclusion.” He regularly attended
the Orthodox liturgy, he fasted, and he
took Communion. He cared for the
Russian people in his own way. But he
was absolutely oblivious to approaching disaster.
He could not truly imagine that the
liberals and socialists in the Russian
Duma, or parliament, were really contemplating a coup d’état or open treason in a time of war. He believed, quite
wrongly it turns out, that “deep down
everyone loved Russia.” He was an
autocrat (at least on paper) who lacked
the will to act, to do anything in a truly
decisive way. And he was surrounded
by nullities at the highest levels of
state, including Golitsyn, the prime
minister, and Protopopov, the unbelievably ineffective minister of the
interior. In the course of these revolutionary days, Protopopov never in formed the emperor about the extent of
unrest and violence in Petrograd. As
one character says, with some under-

statement, “our rulers have fallen
asleep on their watch.”
Matters are made much worse by the
fact that Russian liberals see no enemies to the left. In addition, they confuse the incompetence and mediocrity
of the governing authorities with treason and a deliberate desire to weaken
the war effort and to keep bread from
the people. This is the official line of the
Constitutional Democrats (the “Kadet”
party), the left-liberal opposition that
dominates the Duma and refuses ever to
give the government the benefit of the
doubt. It is in a permanent state of rebellion, representing an educated “society”
(one remarkably indulgent toward terrorists and extremists over the years)
that sees no need for a state that truly
governs. Genuine liberals and moderates, not to mention enlightened conservatives, are rare indeed. Nullities,
demagogues, and brash revolutionaries
abound in Petrograd at the beginning of
1917. And the Duma is dominated by
irresponsible rabble-rousers who like to
hear themselves talk.
The revolution begins with bread
riots and the smashing of bakery windows in the capital on March 8 and 9,
1917. Bread is still available but
rumors abound that it is being deliberately withheld by the government and
uncooperative peasants. The real problem, as Solzhenitsyn makes abundantly
clear, is the price controls that have
locked up the grain market and were
imposed with the support of the Duma.
The left-liberals in that body don’t
know the slightest thing about supply
and demand and the workings of a
modern economic order. In the Duma,
self-obsessed parliamentarians never
really address “the food question” per
se; instead, they brutally denounce the
authorities and spin wholly unconvincing conspiracy theories. When faced
by a thoughtful, knowledgeable, and
effective minister of agriculture, Alexander Rittikh (a protégé of the great
conservative reformer Pyotr Stolypin),
they either ignore him or dismiss his
proposals to put the country above
party and ideology.
Rittikh, one of the heroes of the book,
stuns the left wing by speaking in an utterly
NOVEMBER 27, 2017
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authoritative manner. No mediocrity, he.
For the Left, czarist ministers could
only be “foolish, dense, mute, and fearful”
(Solzhenitsyn’s words), and Rittikh, a
faithful heir of Stolypin, “violated their
entire code.” Rittikh knew that the food
question could be addressed not by
forcibly seizing the peasants’ grain but
by freeing up prices and, in the short
term, appealing to the peasants’ sense
of civic duty. His is the path of enlightened statesmanship. But for the opposition, denouncing the government in the
most vociferous and irresponsible manner took precedence over solving the
food problem. Meanwhile, street bullies began to break store windows to
protest an alleged shortage of grain in
the capital. Demagoguery fed violence,
and violence led to inebriated crowds’
tearing down the entire edifice of civilized order.
Still, the authorities do nothing.
Soldiers defect to the rebels, and loyal
troops are few and far between. Policemen are picked off with increasing
alacrity, and growing venom, by angry
crowds. Red flags are everywhere.

Among the most effective literary
devices in March 1917 are the dramatic
street scenes, which powerfully convey
the chaos unleashed by revolutionary
violence. In Chapter 24, we learn about
the “sense of total safety” that has
“formed among the crowd,” which
feared no retaliation from the authorities.
“The city’s scoundrels”—madmen, criminals, released prisoners—had found a
home among the crowds and begun to
shape their character. Fires spread
throughout the city, and police stations
and military garrisons were attacked by
out-of-control mobs. Here is one dramatic
passage from Chapter 153 that captures
revolutionary nihilism at its ugliest and
most murderous: “Petrograd spent all
evening and night catching and killing its
own police. During the nighttime, they
would kill them on the streets without
even taking them far, or drown them in
ice-holes in the Obvodny Canal. Motorcar expeditions were fitted out to hunt
down policemen.”
All this occurred in a country where
there was a lively, well-organized
political opposition and freedom of

instead opted for a “political earthquake.” They might be right that a
“state cannot stand without freedom.”
But they have forgotten, if they ever
knew, that “freedom cannot stand
without the state.” Struve, again speaking for Solzhenitsyn, exposes the
“flaw” in the Left’s consciousness:
“living in our own country in a permanent state of rebellion.” This, together,
with the regime’s lack of will, is the
root of the disorder.
Struve’s brilliant insights remain relevant for Russia today. As Solzhenitsyn
pointed out in his last major interview,
with Der Spiegel in July 2007, Russia
desperately needs a real opposition, not
just the Communists. But this opposition cannot be merely “oppositional” or
pining for yet another revolution, one
bound like all the others to have tragic
consequences. Russians must learn to
unite order and liberty in a manner fitting that country’s history and political
culture. March 1917 is a model of what
is to be avoided.
Solzhenitsyn is never with the reactionaries or the revolutionaries but

Colonel Vorotyntsev, one of the fictional
heroes of The Red Wheel, wants to do
something to help his country. But he
asks, about the emperor and the nullities surrounding the throne, “How can
someone without a will be helped?” It
is indeed a pertinent question. The
czarist order suffers from a striking
inability to affect events, to take action
for the common good. Rittikh is a notable
exception. The fictional Vorotyntsev
might have been one as well, but he is
preoccupied with marital difficulties
and an affair. Still, he wants to gather
all the scattered “intelligent and firm
men” who might yet fight for a decent
political order in Russia, one that unites
tradition and modernity. (We will see
him in the final scenes of April 1917,
organizing the nucleus of what will
become the White movement. In a later
Solzhenitsyn play, he ends up in the
Gulag, still resisting Communism after
25 years.)

the press. The bulk of the army and
peasant Russia had nothing to do with
this grotesque display of revolutionary
nihilism—it was the work of educated
“society” in conjunction with criminals and the most questionable people
from the Petrograd underworld. There
was nothing noble, nothing conducive
to democracy or self-government,
about the intoxicating violence that
Solzhenitsyn so vividly conveys in
chapter after chapter of March 1917.
In Chapter 44, the ex-Marxist turned
defender of political moderation Pyotr
Struve speaks for the author when he
points out that no freedom is possible
without a “sense of measure.” “The
possibility of freedom is not the same
as freedom.” The czarist regime is anemic or worse—but not particularly
wicked or tyrannical. Struve says that
the leftist opposition, dominated by
faux liberals, has rejected “the normal
evolution” of Russian society and

rather with those liberal conservatives
who want to truly govern while respecting basic liberties. As Krivoshein, a
friend of Rittikh and a former minister
himself, says in Chapter 117, good men
must reject both the spirit of rebellion
and the temptation of tyranny and pursue the path of statesmanship. Stolypin,
the liberal-conservative reformer and
the last great hope of the old regime,
showed how one might assume what he
called “the burden, grief, and joy of
responsibility.” Stolypin might have
continued that path had he not been
gunned down by a double agent in the
Kiev opera house in the fall of 1911. His
fateful death contributed mightily to the
acceleration of the Red Wheel.
Solzhenitsyn describes the complete
blindness and ineptitude of the officials
in the Duma, who established a Provisional Committee that would soon
become the short-lived Provisional
Government. That government would

Russians must learn to unite order and liberty in a manner
fitting that country’s history and political culture.
March 1917 is a model of what is to be avoided.
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almost immediately be outmaneuvered
by the revolutionary Soviets dominated
by Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. The
future leader of the government, Alexander Kerensky, was much too pleased
to be acting capriciously in the name of
“revolutionary law.” Thrilled by his
own loquaciousness, he had no sense of
the likely tragic outcome of this drama.
All in all, he was quite repulsive.
Elsewhere, Solzhenitsyn speaks of the
men of the Provisional Government as
“spineless mediocrities” who governed
Russia for a total of minus-two days.
They lost power before they ever
achieved it. So much for the legend of a
flourishing Russian democracy in the
spring of 1917. This is a myth—or
rather a lie—that finally deserves to be
put to rest.
The final chapter of Volume I of
March 1917 is one of its most poignant.
Grand Duke Mikhail, the czar’s brother,
is awakened in the Winter Palace by his
loyal footman, who tells him the building is under imminent assault. Mikhail
must flee the building with the growing awareness that he is fleeing for all
his ancestors, including his grand father, the czar-liberator, who died in
that palace after a brutal terrorist attack
in 1881. The old order has gone and the
present czar has done nothing to defend
it. Mikhail’s farewell to his footman is
particularly affecting.
What awaits Russia is not democratic
bliss but 70 years of totalitarian mendacity and the death of 30 million
human beings. The remaining volumes
of The Red Wheel will tell the story of
the further descent into chaos and the
concomitant rise of a totalitarian regime
whose ubiquitous symbol was the Gulag
archipelago. In Solzhenitsyn’s view, the
old order needed to both reform itself
and defend itself, but it lacked the will
to do these things. Solzhenitsyn uses
all the power of literary art to portray
the woefully weak character of the czarist
order, incapable as it was of initiating—
or sustaining—action of any sort. This
action-packed account, beautifully
translated by Marian Schwartz, tells the
story of one moment in which the failure of good men to act made all the difference in the world. The University of
Notre Dame Press is to be applauded
for making the remaining volumes of
The Red Wheel available to the Anglophone world.
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The Red
Broom
A N D R E W S T U T TA F O R D

N

Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine,
by Anne Applebaum
(Doubleday, 496 pp., $35)

EARLY 40 years ago, I met
the parents of a graduateschool friend. They were
exiles, Ukrainians, a people
said not to exist, not really. Their son
had told them that I took an unfriendly
interest in Soviet history, and that I
knew a little about their lost homeland.
The father asked if I’d heard about a
famine there in the early 1930s. I had:
something to do with collectivization.
“There was more to it than that.”
In Red Famine, Anne Applebaum, a
prominent journalist and the author of
fine histories of the Gulag and the Soviet
subjugation of Eastern Europe, recounts
just how much more there was. Red
Famine is powerfully written, extensively researched, and, frequently, painful
reading. It tells of a meticulous annihilation that tore a nation away from its traditions, its language, its morality, its
past, its future, its everything: “A woman whose six children died over three
days in May 1933 lost her mind, stopped
wearing clothes, unbraided her hair, and
told everyone that the ‘red broom’ had
taken her family away.”
Her life had unraveled, her culture
had unraveled—there’s accidental symbolism in that unbraiding—and she
unraveled. The land around her unraveled too: once a breadbasket, now a
wasteland, a domain of the dead and
those waiting to die, Muselmänner, as
they were known in Auschwitz.

Neighbor was set against neighbor,
cannibalism was far from rare (yes, you
read that right).
By the time—it took less than a
year—the red broom had completed its
1932–33 sweep (there were smaller
sweeps before and after), roughly 3.9
million Ukrainians were dead: a decimation, and more. Countless others
were deported, many to a Gulag that had
plenty of demand for slave labor. Large
numbers never returned.
Some of this came with collectivization, Stalin’s decision to impose larger
collective or state-owned farming across
the USSR. Even Walter Duranty, the New
York Times’ Moscow correspondent and a
reliable shill for the Soviet dictator,
admitted that collectivization had been a
“mess”; still, he said, while there had
been casualties, “you can’t make an
omelet without breaking eggs.” And
quite often those casualties were not
unwelcome to the regime. Communism,
like the millenarian movements it succeeded, rested on the notion of a great
sorting between sinners and saved.
Collectivization could be used to weed
out enterprising, more successful private
farmers, the relentlessly demonized
“kulaks” (a category regularly expanded
to include peasants who owned, say, a
cow or a pig more than their fellow villagers), who were too smart to be won
over by deceptive promises of the bounty
that Communism would bring to agriculture: They were another of the Soviet
Union’s disposable classes, “former
people” in the sinister and, all too often,
prophetic terminology of that era.
In Ukraine, the noose was drawn far
tighter than anywhere else—a fact still
denied by today’s Kremlin and its apologists. The millions who starved to
death there, like those who died in
famines elsewhere in the USSR at that
time, were, it is maintained, the victims
of a reckless agricultural experiment,
nothing more. Applebaum agrees that
the “chaos of collectivization helped
create the conditions that led to famine,”
but rightly goes on to argue that neither
chaos, nor the weather, nor crop failure
can account for the death toll in Ukraine,
and especially that terrible spike in the
spring of 1933. For that, the better
explanation is a series of measures enacted by the regime that can only have
been intended to kill. There’s a reason
this famine is known to Ukrainians as
NOVEMBER 27, 2017

